Abstract. Let G = (V, E) be a graph modeling a network where each edge is owned by a selfish agent, which establishes the cost for traversing her edge (i.e., assigns a weight to her edge) by pursuing only her personal utility. In such a setting, we aim at designing approximate truthful mechanisms for several NP-hard traversal problems on G, like the graphical traveling salesman problem, the rural postman problem, and the mixed Chinese postman problem, either of which asks for using an edge of G several times, in general. Thus, in game-theoretic terms, these are one-parameter problems, but with a peculiarity: the work load of each agent is a natural number. In this paper we refine the classic notion of monotonicity of an algorithm so as to exactly capture this property, and we then provide a general mechanism design technique that guarantees this monotonicity and that allows to compute efficiently the corresponding payments. In this way, we show that the former two problems and the latter one admit a 3/2-and a 2-approximate truthful mechanism, respectively. Thus, for the first two problems we match the best known approximation ratios holding for their corresponding centralized versions, while for the third one we are only a 4/3-factor away from it.
Introduction
Nowadays, physical components of many large communication and transportation networks are often owned by different economic subjects, which, when asked to provide a service, tend to act selfishly and to pursue only their personal goals. On the other hand, from the users' point of view, there is an increasing demand for a rational usage of the network resources, meaning that one should know at each instant -ideally -what is the real marginal contribution that a component can offer. Traditionally, when a system-wide goal has to be implemented on the network, the problem of reconciling this conflict of interests between owners and users has been exclusively addressed by the subfield of game theory known as mechanism design. However, more recently, the consciousness that besides economic factors, computational complexity and distributed computing issues must be taken into proper consideration as well, has led up to an increasing involvement in the playground of the computer science community. This resulted in the emergence of an active research field which is known by today as computational (or algorithmic) mechanism design [12] .
Informally speaking, an algorithmic mechanism design problem can be thought as a classic well-formulated optimization problem, but with the additional complication that part of the input is retained by the selfish agents. Hence, it turns out that one has to compute efficiently a feasible solution to the given optimization problem, by incentivizing the agents, through suitable payments, to disclose to the system their secret data. More formally, a mechanism is a pair made up of an algorithm for computing a solution, and a specification of the payments (which is a function of the inputs disclosed by the agents and of the corresponding computed solution) provided to the agents. A mechanism is truthful if its payments guarantee that agents are not encouraged to lie.
Since the Internet appears as the ultimate platform where algorithmic mechanism design optimization problems find application, not surprisingly most of the efforts so far concentrated on designing efficient truthful mechanisms for solving several communication network problems [8, 9, 12, 14, 16] . All these results are either based on the classic VCG-mechanisms, which are applicable whenever the underlying problem is utilitarian, 1 or they are based on the results of Archer and Tardos [1] for the so-called one-parameter problems, where the information held by each agent can be expressed throughout a single value. In particular, in [1] it is shown that the truthfulness of a one-parameter mechanism is related to a property of the underlying algorithm known as monotonicity. 
Our Results
In this paper, we aim to extend the horizon to a different category of optimization problems, namely that of graph traversal problems. From a purely optimization perspective, such a class of problems has been addressed extensively by many researchers, mainly because of the immediate transportation and logistic applications. Besides, since of the renewed interest in toll roads, either managed by governments or private societies, in the last few years the literature devoted to the so-called road pricing got considerably enriched, with contributions from both economists and operation researchers (e.g., see [3] and the papers therein cited).
